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This essay tells a story of changing views about economists’conceptions
of what economic theory has to say about the role of government in the
economy.1 It considers three views. One is the view of J. N. Keynes and
Lionel Robbins, who argue that pure economic theory has little or noth-
ing to say about policy, but that a separate branch of economics exists
that should consider such policy issues. A second view is that of Alfred
MarshallandA.C.Pigou,whoarguethata“realistic”theorycanbeused
to guide judgments on policy. The third view, which is most closely re-
lated to an “economics of control” view set out by Abba Lerner, con-
nects pure theory, policy, and the role of government in the economy in
a more direct way, drawing implications about policy and the role of the
state from pure theory.
Thisessaydiscussestheevolutionofthesethreeviewsandarguesthat
the ﬁrst two are actually much more compatible than they at ﬁrst seem.
They both can be seen as a “muddling through” approach to policy, in
which pure economic theory does not give much guidance for policy.
The third view, in which pure theory gives direct guidance for policy, is
incompatiblewiththeothertwo.Theessayconcludesbyarguingthatthe
current textbook presentation of policy follows the third view and that,
I would like to thank D. P. O’Brien and participants of the 2004 HOPE conference, and espe-
cially Craufurd Goodwin, for their comments on an earlier version of this essay.
1. Thisessayisnotafullconsiderationoftheissuesanddoesnotdiscusshowoutsideevents
inﬂuenced economists’ thinking. Instead it focuses on economists’ changing methodological
views about what the role of theory is and of how that theory should be used in thinking about
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while the ﬁrst two are quite reasonable views, this third view is at best
misleading and at worst simply wrong.
J. N. Keynes’s Muddling Through
Thestandardmethodologicalreferenceinthelate1800sisJ.N.Keynes’s
Scope and Method of Political Economy ([1891] 1955). In it, Keynes,
following earlier economists, divided economics into three branches—
positive, normative, and art. He deﬁned the branches as follows: “Posi-
t i v es c i e n c e...abody of systematized knowledge concerning what is;
normative or regulative science...abody of systematized knowledge
discussing criteria of what ought to be...;a r t...asystem of rules for
the attainment of a given end” (34–35). Keynes’s book played an impor-
tant role in clarifying many of the confusions that had existed in eco-
nomics and became the standard methodological statement of the time.
Keynes argued that maintaining a separate positive science quite distinct
from applied policy, which was what he meant by the art of economics,
was necessary to avoid confusions about the relation between theory and
policy. For Keynes positive theory had no policy implications because of
the complexity of those real-world policy problems.Applied policy was
necessarily muddling through and should be seen as such.
Keynes was very deﬁnite about the highly limited role of theory in
applied policy. He writes:
Few practical problems admit of complete solution on economic
grounds alone....when we pass for instance, to problems of taxa-
tion, or to problems that concern the relations of the state with trade
and industry, or to the general discussion of communistic and social-
istic schemes—it is far from being the case that economic considera-
tions hold the ﬁeld exclusively.Account must also be taken of ethical,
social, and political considerations that lie outside the sphere of polit-
ical economy regarded as a science. (34)
Thus,itwouldbegenerallyagreedthat,indealingwithpracticalques-
tions, an abstract method of treatment avails less and carries us much
less far than when we are dealing with theoretical questions. In other
words,indealingwiththeformerclassofquestions,wearetoagreater
extent dependent upon history and inductive generalization. (63)Views ofApplied Policy from Keynes to Lerner 279
We are, accordingly, led to the conclusion...that a deﬁnitive art of
political economy, which attempts to lay down absolute rules for the
regulation of human conduct, will have vaguely deﬁned limits, and be
largely non-economic in character. (83)
The methodology of applied policy for Keynes was quite different
from the methodology he saw for positive economics. It was inductive,
relying on history and educated common sense. Pure theory—positive
economics—was used by Keynes as a backdrop for thinking about pol-
icy problems; it was useful to help organize one’s thoughts but not to be
applied to real-world problems. For Keynes, questions about the role of
the state belonged in the art of economics; such questions could only be
answered by addressing issues that went far beyond economic theory.
Answers about the role of the state were to be found in a broader
philosophicaltraditionofliberalism.Suchpolicyquestionswouldbede-
cided on economic, moral, practical, political, and social grounds. Econ-
omists in their role as individuals or as social philosophers might have
something to say about such questions, but as economic theorists they
had little to say because in that role they did not consider the noneco-
nomic aspects of the questions. Economics was an input into policy; it
did not come to policy conclusions.
In distinguishing between implications that could be drawn from pos-
itive theory and implications that could be drawn from the art branch
of economics, Keynes distinguished theorems from precepts.A theorem
was a conclusion that followed from positive economic theory; it con-
cerned how the economy worked. It did not concern policy questions
dealing with the role of the state. A precept was a rule of thumb that
concerned policy; it followed from the art of economics and was not de-
rived from economic theory but from introspection, induction, and an
educated common sense. Pure theory (positive economics) played a role
in developing that educated common sense because it revealed logical
errors in initial commonsense reasoning, but otherwise theory was not
involved in determining policy or the role of the state. There could be
preceptsabouttheroleofthestate,buttherewouldbenotheoremsabout
the role of the state. For Keynes, and for classical economists more gen-
erally, the doctrine of laissez-faire was a precept, not a theorem.
The “precept/theorem” and “art/positive/normative” distinctions did
not leave much of a role for pure economic theory in guiding economic
policy. In terms of the then raging Methodenstreit between those fa-
voring an analytic approach and those favoring a historical approach to280 David Colander
economics, Keynes’s solution gave applied policy to the historicists and
gave the scientiﬁc branch of economics—positive theory—to the theo-
rists. But his solution also left one with the feeling that the scientists
had not won much, since, other than in some unspeciﬁed abstract way,
positive economics was irrelevant for applied policy.
Keynes’s view of theory has a long history in English classical eco-
nomics and was most directly a continuation of the views of economists
such as Nassau Senior ([1836] 1951). In this view theorems are sim-
ply logical proofs; they convey nothing other than the implications of
assumptions one makes.2 Theory was simply a system of logical deduc-
tions from a series of postulates derived from introspection, which are
not themselves subject to empirical veriﬁcation. Theory might be useful
as a backdrop for pondering the role of the state, but theory would not
answer the question of what that role was and would certainly not lend
itself to specifying rules of actions that the state should follow.
The Marshallian Straddle
Methodological pronouncements are seldom followed, and although
Keynes’s work was generally accepted as the best statement of the state
ofmethodologyofthetime,feweconomistscarefullyfollowedhismeth-
odological prescriptions.3 An example is Alfred Marshall, who was a
colleague of Keynes. Although clearly Marshall had read and discussed
with Keynes the methodological issues that Keynes wrote about, Mar-
shall proceeded to write his Principles of Economics with little direct
reference to Keynes’s work and did not distinguish between the art and
science of economics. Instead, Marshall approached the distinction be-
tween theory and policy quite differently, speciﬁcally blurring the dis-
tinction between positive economics and applied policy, or the art of
economics.Infact,inearlyeditionsofPrinciples,hearguedagainsthav-
ing a separate art of economics and focused on economics as a science.4
2. The philosopher Alexander Rosenberg (1992) has examined modern micro theory and
has argued that it has these characteristics.
3. Economists then, as economists now, do what they do. Actual economics develops with
only a weak tie to methodological prescriptions. More often than not, methodology serves as
an ex post rationalization for what economists do rather than a guide to what they should do.
4. Marshall argued against the use of the phrase “the art of economics” in the early editions
of Principles. However, as Marshall’s editor points out, between the third (1895) and fourth
(1898) editions, Marshall cut from his Principles a paragraph arguing against using the phrase
“art of economics” ([1890] 1961, 2:154).Views ofApplied Policy from Keynes to Lerner 281
He could do this by changing what was meant by the concepts of sci-
ence and positive economics. Marshall’s concept of science was not the
logical-deductive science that Keynes had in mind but instead a type of
applied science, which was more a type of engineering than it was a pure
science. For Marshall, science was about solving real-world problems,
not understanding for the sake of understanding. Put another way, for
Marshall “science” was a tool in the art of economics.5
The important point here is that for Marshall, the positive econom-
ics of Keynes was practically nonexistent; all economics was art. An
economic theorist for Marshall was not a scientist but instead a policy
economist who created useful tools that could explicate an actual real-
world problem. Marshall simply dismissed the logical-deductive branch
of economics as being useless and advocated a type of theory that was,
in essence, a sub-branch of art. Marshall justiﬁed his position by arguing
thateconomicsdoesnotavailitselftolongdeductivechainsofreasoning
and thus had to concern itself with shedding light on practical issues.6
Unfortunately, Marshall did not make clear precisely what he was do-
ing,andheneverdiscussedhowhisapproachdifferedfromKeynes’s.He
straddled the methodological issues, as he straddled many issues.7 Even
withhislimitedinterpretationoftheory,Marshallwasextremelyhesitant
to draw policy conclusions. Policy was too complicated and involved too
many noneconomic variables. For example, when he discussed the art of
economics in the fourth edition of Principles he wrote:
5. Marshall’s argument against art and his focus on economics as science must be under-
stood in the context of the times; when he was writing, economics as a separate discipline did
not yet exist. The majority of economists he dealt with talked about policy, not theory. Only a
small minority did theory or followed a logical-deductive approach.As he was writing Princi-
ples, he was also petitioning Cambridge to set up separate tripos in economics and was very
much concerned that the objectivity of economics be maintained (Marshall 1902). Given his
institutional needs, it is not surprising that he combined the art of economics and positive eco-
nomics, and called it economics rather than political economy. To have emphasized Keynes’s
distinction would have worked against his desire to set up a separate tripos in economics.
6. Consistent with that view in Principles, he placed all general equilibrium issues in a two-
page footnote (Marshall [1890] 1961, mathematical note 21). Such theoretical issues could not
be dealt with using the mathematical techniques available and thus were beyond theorizing.
7. For example, he eschewed mathematics but simultaneously structured his arguments in
the Principles so that they could be deduced mathematically. (The mathematics were placed in
an appendix if they were included at all.) He incorporated enormous institutional and historical
insights into his Principles, but he simultaneously removed the term political from the name
of economics discipline, naming his book Principles of Economics rather than Principles of
Political Economy. This change in name further moved the profession away from Keynes’s
methodologicalperspectivebecausethetermpoliticaleconomy suggeststhatthereisanapplied




under given circumstances; and if the difﬁculties of the problem are
chieﬂy economic, he may speak with a certain authority. But on the
whole,thoughthematterisoneonwhichopinionsdiffer,itseemsbest
that he should do so rather in his private capacity, than as claiming to
speak with the authority of economic science. (Marshall [1890] 1898,
2:154)
While such careful prescriptions about drawing policy implications
from theory may seem to be similar to those of Keynes, there was a ma-
jor difference between their views. For Marshall, positive theory was a
tool of applied policy; it was a working abstraction, a tool, not a truth.8
Since theory was only a tool, it was not a problem if one’s theoretical
apparatus incorporated some normative judgments and institutional re-
alities as long as those value judgments were recognized and were useful
in making the theory more applicable. As a tool, theory did not have to
be pure; it simply had to be useful.
One can best see Marshall’s approach to theory through the tools he
devised. Consider the concept of consumer surplus, which Marshall de-
veloped as a theoretical tool useful in shedding light on some policy
questions. It integrated the welfare of all individuals into an area under
a curve and thereby included the implicit value judgment that an indi-
vidual’s welfare was comparable and interchangeable. As a tool of pure
science,themodelsbuiltonthatassumptionwereuseless,butasatoolof
a practicing economist, the models could be useful in certain instances,
as long as in applying the analysis one carefully considered the limiting
assumptions on which the analysis was built.
Marshall generally limited the use of his tools to applications for
which he thought they ﬁt. For example, consider his view of utility and
tastes.HespeciﬁcallyrejectsWilliamStanleyJevons’sandCarlMenger’s
view that economics should be seen as the science of meeting given
wants and argues that our wants are not independent. He writes that
“while wants are the rulers of life among the lower animals, it is to
changes in the forms of efforts and activities that we must turn when
in search for the keynotes of the history of mankind” (Marshall [1890]
8. J. M. Keynes (1922, v) summarized Marshall’s approach to theory as follows: “The the-
ory of economics is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique of
thinking which helps its possessor to draw correct conclusions.”Views ofApplied Policy from Keynes to Lerner 283
1961, 85). He further writes: “The higher study of consumption must
come after, and not before, the main body of economic analysis; and,
though it may have its beginning within the proper domain of econom-
ics, it cannot ﬁnd its conclusion there, but must extend far beyond” (90–
91).
For Marshall economic reasoning was an input into a broader pol-
icy analysis, and economic theory was an input into economic reason-
ing that is designed for the policy problem at hand. The difference be-
tween Keynes and Marshall is that for Keynes, theory is a deductive set
of propositions involving long deductive chains of reasoning from ini-
tial assumptions. It is as pure as possible and avoids as many value judg-
ments as possible. Modern general equilibrium theory would be an ex-
ample of Keynes’s pure theory. Theory, for Marshall, was makeshift; it
speciﬁcally did not involve long deductive chains of arguments, but in-
stead involved short chains of arguments, consistent with his “one thing
at a time” approach. Its structure was determined by the policy problem
one was addressing, and one would make generally accepted normative
assumptionsthatﬁttheproblemathandinordertomakethetheorymore
useful. For Marshall it was acceptable to integrate value judgments into
the theory as long as those value judgments were clearly expressed, and
if one took them into account when drawing on theory to arrive at a pol-
icy conclusion.
Pigou’s Realistic Economics
A. C. Pigou followed Marshall at Cambridge and set the tone for ap-
plied economics that was used in the 1920s and 1930s.While mindful of
Keynes’s distinction between art and science, Pigou followed Marshall
in developing economic theory as a sub-branch of the art of econom-
ics rather than as a logical-deductive science. Pigou, however, is much
clearer about his method, and he speciﬁcally states that he is not doing
pure theory but is instead doing what he called “realistic theory.” He
writes: “Hence it must be the realistic, not the pure, type of science that
constitutes the object of our search” (Pigou [1920] 2002, 6). To make
this point even clearer, Pigou distinguishes between fruit-bearing theory
and light-bearing theory (3). Fruit-bearing theory—realistic theory—is
a branch of the art of economics; it is theory designed to solve particular
policy problems. Light-bearing theory is pure theory, or theory belong-
ing in Keynes’s positive branch of economics.284 David Colander
As was the case with Marshall, Pigou has nothing to say about pure
theory, which was what Keynes meant by positive economics; it sim-
ply was not part of Pigou’s approach. Pigou’s welfare economics must
be seen in this light; it was not meant to be a ﬁnal guide to policy. It
was about precepts, not theorems. But, unlike Keynes, whose precepts
were largely determined outside economic theory, Pigou’s precepts were
developed within his realistic theory that embodied generally accepted
value judgments.
Since his realistic theory was a tool of the art of economics, the ab-
sence of any normative welfare judgments, and the consistency of the
analysis among different applications, was far less important than it was
forKeynes.AswasthecasewithMarshall,Pigounormallyacceptedthat
normative judgments could be built into theory, as long as one was clear
about what those judgments were and did not argue that those who dis-
agreed with those value judgments were incorrect based on economic
reasoning. Economic theory was a set of tools, not rules, for policy-
makers.
The approach Pigou took to utility theory was consistent with this
policy approach. He speciﬁcally did not use the term utility but instead
used the term desiredness (23). Desiredness was determinable by intro-
spection and was comparable across averages of individuals.9 For Pigou,
desiredness was not a precise measure of a consumer’s welfare but sim-
ply a rough measure for his or her material welfare to be used when
thinking about policy issues and in explaining the results of economic
analysis to others.
Since the tools were designed to come to a policy conclusion, the
embodied value judgments had to be justiﬁed. Pigou spends much of
his Economics of Welfare doing precisely that. For example, he writes:
“It is fair to suppose that most commodities, especially those of wide
consumption that are required, as articles of food and clothing are, for
direct personal use, will be wanted as a means to satisfaction” (Pigou
[1920] 2002, 24). For Pigou, an increase in consumption—meeting peo-
ple’s desires—did not mean that there was deﬁnitely an improvement in
the welfare of society; he simply meant that it most likely would be an
improvement. He devoted many pages of his Economics of Welfare to
explaining why, as a general precept, one could use social dividend as a
rough guide to welfare for many policy changes.
9. The term utility only shows up once in Pigou’s Economics of Welfare, and then only to
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Hisintrospectiveuseofutilityledhimtoincludetwosigniﬁcantinter-
related normative judgments in his analysis. First, he held that, in gen-
eral, income going to rich people had less positive impact on society’s
welfare than income going to poor people. Based on this assumption, he
could favor policies supporting redistribution from rich to poor if that
transfer did not decrease the social dividend. He argued that such trans-
fers “enable more intense wants to be satisﬁed at the expense of less
intense wants” (89). Second, he argued that it was inappropriate to dif-
ferentiate individuals’abilities to generate pleasure, thus speciﬁcally ex-
cluding the argument that the rich needed more money to fulﬁll their
more reﬁned tastes. Tastes, he argued, were changeable, and if the poor
were given more income, they would develop more reﬁned tastes.
Pigou did not deny that these aspects of his welfare economics in-
volved very speciﬁc normative judgments, but, for him, they were rea-
sonablejudgments,sharedwithalargepartofthepopulation.Theywere
also necessary judgments to make the tools relevant for applied policy.
Since his was realistic theory, not pure theory, Pigou argued that such
judgments were quite acceptable as long as one was clear that they were
being made.
Lionel Robbins’s Political Economy
Pigou’s work on welfare economics provoked a reaction from Lionel
Robbins, who, in his famous Essay on the Nature and Signiﬁcance of
Economic Science (1932), speciﬁcally criticized the Pigovian-Marshal-
lian approach to theory and policy. His argument is similar to Keynes’s
argument in 1890 and thus is best seen as a call for the return to the
methodology of Keynes’s initial art-science distinction. Robbins essen-
tially states that what Pigou and Marshall called theory was not theory at
all but was instead something else. For Robbins theory is what Keynes
meant by theory—logical abstract deductions—and is what Pigou had
classiﬁed as “light-seeking theory” to contrast it with the “fruit-seeking
theory” that Pigou was interested in.
In making his argument, Robbins resurrected the ordinalist approach
to welfare analysis in which economic welfare was not material wel-
fare, as it was for Marshall and Pigou, but, instead, a broader concept
that implied satisfaction of desire. The difference between the two def-
initions had been remarked on by Vilfredo Pareto ([1909] 1971), who
made a distinction between utility and ophelimity. Pareto’s concept of286 David Colander
utility was the equivalent of what Pigou called desiredness; it was deter-
minable by introspection and was comparable across averages of indi-
viduals. Pareto’s concept of ophelimity was the equivalent of Robbins’s
concept of utility. It referred to satisfaction of desire; it was not deter-
minable or comparable among individuals; it was appropriate for pure
science but was of little help in applied policy work. Marshall’s and
Pigou’s economics took the Pareto utility approach; it was a rough-and-
ready guide for policy that embodied generally accepted welfare judg-
ments. Robbins’s economics took the ophelimity approach; it concerned
precise statements about the welfare of individuals that could be drawn
from economic theory.
Robbins criticized the material welfare aspect of Marshall’s and Pi-
gou’s analysis and chose his deﬁnition of economics, “the allocation of
scarce resources among alternative ends,” to speciﬁcally rule out the
“study of the causes of material welfare” deﬁnition that he attributed
to Marshall and Pigou. Robbins argued that any tools involving inter-
personal welfare judgments had no scientiﬁc basis. Robbins’s alternative
deﬁnition both expanded and contracted the domain of economics. It ex-
panded it because it now included all activities and goods, not just those
that affected material welfare. But it simultaneously contracted the do-
main of economics by limiting the amount of interpersonal comparabil-
ity that was allowed, since that comparability had no scientiﬁc basis.10
Given his deﬁnition of pure theory, Robbins was very careful to say
that no policy conclusions followed from economic theory. In his 1981
Ely Lecture, which developed ideas in his book on classical economics
(Robbins 1953), Robbins reﬂected on his argument and expanded on his
distinction. There he argued that “the raison d’être of welfare econom-
ics” is to be “able to pronounce as a matter of scientiﬁc demonstration
thatsuchandsuchapolicywasgoodorbad”(Robbins1981,4;emphasis
in the original). He stated: “In the great work of Marshall and, still more,
Pigou, we are assuming comparisons...(that are)...n o tw arranted by
anything which is legitimately assumed by scientiﬁc economics” (4–5).
He cites Bentham as agreeing with him that interpersonal utility com-
parisons are “in vain” and that any economic analysis based on any as-
sumption about such comparisons is unscientiﬁc and therefore outside
the domain of economics.
10. For a discussion of the distinction between these two approaches, see Cooter and Rap-
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ButaswasthecasewithKeynes,Robbinsdidnotstopthere;herecog-
nized that his deﬁnition of the science of economics was highly limiting
and would mean that economics has little, if anything, to say about pol-
icy, since “all recommendations of policy involve judgments of value”
(6). Thus, he speciﬁcally called for a separate branch of economics that
he called political economy. He writes: “My suggestion here, as in the
Introduction to my Political Economy: Past and Present, is that its use
should be revived as now covering that part of our sphere of interest
which essentially involves judgments of value. Political Economy, thus
conceived, is quite unashamedly concerned with the assumptions of pol-
icy and the results ﬂowing from them” (7, 8).
Robbins sees political economy as distinct from economics in the
stricter sense of the word. It involves “all modes of analysis and ex-
plicit or implicit judgments of value.”While he does not call it the art of
economics, Robbins’s political economy is an almost perfect parallel to
Keynes’s art branch of economics. Moreover, if one sees Pigou’s realistic
economics as a form of Robbins’s political economy, not as pure theory,
there is little difference between Robbins’s and Pigou’s view of how pol-
icyanalysisneedstobeconductedinreferencetotheory.Pigouwassim-
ply developing an approach that Keynes and Robbins said needed to be
developed but did not develop and did not believe deserved to be called
economic theory.
Abba Lerner’s Economics of Control
The last writer I will consider in this paper is Abba Lerner, whose Eco-
nomics of Control: Principles of Welfare Economics (1944) provided
a template for the approach to policy that current textbooks take. Al-
though Lerner was a student of Lionel Robbins (and Lerner speciﬁcally
statesthattheideaswerelikelyabsorbedfromhisteachersattheLondon
School of Economics, including Robbins and Friedrich Hayek [Lerner
1944,viii]),Lerner’sworkdoesnotﬁtnicelyintoRobbins’smethodolog-
ical position. Instead, it more closely follows Marshall’s and Pigou’s,
since Lerner is drawing policy implications directly from theory. Unfor-
tunately, he did not make clear the distinction between pure and realistic
theory that Pigou made. Lerner thus left open the possibility that his pol-
icy conclusions followed from pure economic theory, not from a realis-
tic theory that had already embodied numerous welfare judgments that
needed to be discussed and accepted before one could apply the results
of the analysis.288 David Colander
The likelihood that people would interpret his work as implying that
policy conclusions followed from theory was increased because, unlike
Marshall and Pigou who carefully discussed the limitations of theory to
drawing policy conclusions, Lerner speciﬁcally applied his theories to
policy and aggressively related theory to policy conclusions.11 He made
no distinction between precepts (derived from the art of economics em-
bodyingvaluejudgmentsinthetheory)andtheorems(derivedfrompure
theory and quite irrelevant for policy). Thus, he argued that while inter-
personal comparisons of welfare were impossible, “probable compar-
isons” were not and that redistribution policy should be based on “prob-
able total satisfaction” (Lerner 1944, 29). Consistent with this view, he
drew out speciﬁc rules for how government could achieve the optimal
distribution of income.
As opposed to developing tools for policy analysts, who would in turn
develop policy precepts, as Marshall and Pigou did, Lerner developed
speciﬁc rules of policy from pure theory, identifying precisely what gov-
ernment should do to maximize social welfare. These rules, because of
their simplicity and clearness, became the template for the textbook pre-
sentation of both micro and macro policy discussions.12 In microeco-
nomics these rules became the rules of welfare economics involving the
equating of marginal social costs with marginal social beneﬁts. These
rules, which are known as the Lange-Lerner rules, became the guiding
rules of welfare economics.13
In macro, Lerner (1941, 4, 5) developed the rules of functional ﬁ-
nance, which involved the government maintaining “a reasonable level
of demand at all times” through appropriate ﬁscal policy and a mone-
tary policy governed only by the need to maintain “the optimal amount
11. In doing so he followed the approach of David Ricardo ([1817] 1953), an approach
characterized by Joseph Schumpeter (1954) as the Ricardian vice.
12. Lerner’s early writing played an important role in the socialist calculation debate that
was ongoing at the time, and Lerner was very much concerned with the arguments behind the
state’s role in the economy. In that debate Lerner advocated market socialism and argued that
socialistplannerscouldgivedirectivestomanagerstopriceatmarginalcosts,therebyachieving
maximum social welfare.
13. Speciﬁcally, government should adjust resources until the following series of equations
are met: Msb = p = mpr = mpc = vmf = msc (Lerner 1944, 96). His rules on income
redistribution did not become part of the textbook template. Lerner agreed that we had no ba-
sis for making interpersonal welfare comparisons, but argued that because of the uncertainty
principle, redistribution was more likely to improve social welfare than hurt it, and thus he sup-
ported redistribution and deﬁned his welfare rules to include redistribution. Later economists
switched to a welfare economic focus only on Pareto efﬁciency.Views ofApplied Policy from Keynes to Lerner 289
of investment” and by the functional needs of the economy, not by any
precepts of “sound ﬁnance.”14
These policy rules that Lerner developed were not presented as gen-
eral guidelines to be used in combination with noneconomic consider-
ations, as were the precepts of Marshall and Pigou. Instead, they were
presented as ﬁrm rules based on economic theory. They were presented
as forming the basis of policy—the blueprints that governments should
follow—if government wanted to work in the social interest. For exam-
ple, in the introduction to the Economics of Control Lerner (1944, 6)
writes: “We shall concentrate on what would be the best thing that the
government can do in the social interest—what institutions would most
effectively induce the individual members of society, while seeking to
accomplish their own ends, to act in the way which is most beneﬁcial
for society as a whole....Here we shall merely attempt to show what
is socially desirable.”
In making his arguments, Lerner combined a much longer chain of
reasoning into the purely economic analysis than either Marshall or Pi-
gou had been willing to do.15 Whereas Marshall’s work was primarily
partial equilibrium in nature and designed to solve speciﬁc policy issues,
Lerner drew policy rules from general equilibrium theory, using long
chains of reasoning, an approach that Marshall argued against.
Had Lerner followed J. N. Keynes’s approach and presented his own
work as pure theory, with little relevance for policy, Lerner’s economics
of control approach would have been consistent with that of previous
writers. But Lerner did not take that view. He drew very speciﬁc rules
about policy from theory, as one might do in a Pigovian-Marshallian
framework.Indoingso,heignoredthepositive/artdistinctionofKeynes,
the economics/political economy distinction of Robbins, and the fruit-
seeking/light-seekingdistinctionofPigou.Inshort,hemovedawayfrom
a “muddling through” vision of applied policy, in which pure theory had
no direct relevance for policy, a vision held by all previous writers, and
14. Unlike the other economists I have been discussing, Lerner also arrived at deﬁnite pol-
icy rules for macro policy. He did so because early in his career he became enamored of mac-
roeconomics and became a leading expositor of Keynesian ideas. His exposition of these rules
was precise, and they became the foundation for much of the textbook presentation of Keynes-
ian economics.
15. Marshall was not alone in this; during the 1930s and 1940s when Lerner was writing,
there was a larger movement occurring in economics from a Marshallian partial equilibrium
method to a Walrasian general equilibrium method. Lerner’s work was part of this broader
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replaced it with an “economics of control” vision of applied policy, in
which speciﬁc policy rules followed from pure theory.
Conclusion
I am primarily a teacher of economics. The reason I am interested in
the above history is that it sheds light on how we came to the particu-
lar structure of micro and macro that currently dominates the textbooks.
That framework remains essentially the framework that Lerner devel-
oped, although in macro, with the demise of Keynesian economics, pre-
cisely what we are teaching students is unclear.16 The microeconomic
framework that we teach is a framework in which we teach students an
applied policy approach where policy conclusions seem to be directly
drawn from theory. What this history points out is that our current mi-
croeconomic textbook presentation would be unacceptable to Keynes,
Marshall, Pigou, and Robbins.
Where they differed was not in their view of what policy conclusions
could be drawn from theory but rather in where they saw economists
ﬁtting into the applied policy process. Keynes’s and Robbins’s pure the-
ory leads to no applied policy rules; it leads to a framework that might
be helpful in thinking about the art of economics, but it does not lead
to any policy conclusions. For them, policy discussions belong not in
economics but in a separate branch of economics, called either political
economy or the art of economics. Marshall’s and Pigou’s realistic theory
leads to applied policy rules, but it does so only because it starts with the
premisethatallappliedpolicynecessarilyinvolvesvaluejudgments,and
Marshall and Pigou give explicit consideration to those value judgments
and discuss numerous noneconomic issues. Even Lerner’s framework,
which combines the two approaches, retains an explicit consideration
of distributional issues and is built on the assumption that governments
have resolved these. Unfortunately, such considerations of the necessary
element of value judgments in any discussion of policy are not presented
in most economics texts, since they do not distinguish a separate “art of
economics” branch for policy or make it clear that they are using tools
that already embody normative judgments.
16. Even in macro, the models that many principles textbooks use to discuss monetary and
ﬁscal policy retain signiﬁcant elements of the ideas of functional ﬁnance, although authors are
much more circumspect about the policy relevance of the models than were earlier textbook
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All of the economists I have considered, with the possible exception
of Lerner, would have a problem with the current textbook microeco-
nomics presentation, because it violates Hume’s dictum—that you can-
not derive a should from an is. They all accepted the need to go beyond
pure economic theory to have anything to say about policy or the role of
the state. For all of them, applied policy, and questions about the role of
the state in the economy, is a muddle. For them the role of the economic
theorist is not to give answers but to provide input into a broader policy
decision process that goes far beyond economics. That insight has been
lost in the texts, and that is sad.
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